Previous posts in the series:
Part 1: Audit Collection Services is installed, now what?
In part 1, we discussed the real function of ACS, differentiated between product and process, and touched on a couple of the necessary preparations and considerations. AC is simple enough to configure - today I want to focus on effectively utilizing your security information data throughout its lifetime. This is commonly called as the Information Lifecycle or more specifically the Security Information Lifecycle.
For purposes of our discussion, we will consider the Security Information Lifecycle in terms of the following phases:
- Collection - Acquisition and management of log data. This step is the foundation for the event analytics (the processes) that ultimately comprise any successful security and compliance initiative
- Examination - Examining the data for anomalies or patterns of interest.
- Analysis - When an anomaly is identified, this triggers data auditing (human analysis)…ad-hoc auditing so to speak.
- Review - Periodic examination of data as part of the scheduled auditing process.
At the end of the day, ACS is a Security Information Management (SIM) solution, and like every SIM on the market, what it lacks out of the box is the human intelligence and skill in data analysis of a good security engineer.
Audit Collection Services represents the automation of phase 1. Phases 2 and 3 are where the auditor (or some automated form of audit logic) we have to take some action. This is where data analysis comes into play. There is good out of the box reporting, but from a process perspective we need to act on this data. There is no automated processing analyzing this data.
And this is especially important because the event data contained in the ACS database is a rolling data set. If you accepted the defaults during installation, the data is groomed by the nightly maintenance task at 14 days old. If your company has no externally legislated data retention requirements that prompted your to purchase a 3rd party ACS data archiving solution, 14 days is end-of-life for that data. If you don’t take action on this data, it’s gone forever and the opportunity lost. And even if you do have a 3rd party archiving solution, it is less expensive (in terms of human effort) and business value (in terms of problems uncovered) if we analyze this data sooner rather than later, while the data is still fresh, online and accessible.
NOTE: The 3rd party add-ons from companies like Enterprise Certified and SecureVantage bring numerous benefits we will discuss in a future installment.
So the million dollar question is: How can we more aggressively and effectively analyze and utilize this data before it is groomed, and without watching a console all day?
So let’s consider a simple scenario. You work for a company with ACS deployed to support internally-defined security policies, with no 3rd party archiving add-on. There are really a couple of different ways we could go about this.
- We could simply schedule various ACS reports to run periodically and e-mail or publish to a file share. Definitely some value in this, and while it potentially results in an extensive set of reports to comb through, if we target these reports at the key events we care about, it’s a definite improvement over the alternative.
- Use scripts querying the ACS high-performance WMI provider. We could, but there is an easier way in my opinion. (Incidentally, I will touch on how this provider should be utilized in a later post.)
- Through the strategic use of ACS in conjunction with Event Rules to watch for changes and then raise alerts - Think MOM 2005 here. How did we audit for security events in MOM 2005? Through event rules matching the criteria we define! This is a simple 2-step strategy:
a. As an engineer or auditor, I use the events I wish to watch for and create rules in Operations Manager to watch for these events and generate alerts. This could be login failures, auditing changes to my Active Directory, whatever.
b. When an event is matched and an alert is raised, this is my prompt to run the appropriate ACS reports and do my analysis to establish the timeline and sequence of events.
In short, we use monitoring to fire an alert that prompts internal auditors or service owners to utilize Event Log data collected by ACS to analyze the event.
The trigger used in our 3rd method is something every MOM 2005 admin is familiar with, but very effective as it allows us to make use of data triggers outside the Security Event Log as well (e.g. - SQL logon failures) with the tools we already have in place. We catch events of local significance, and then analyze their global significance and scope (across multiple systems) through ACS report data.
Why this makes sense:
This may seem counter-intuitive strategy until you consider the fact that the ACS interfaces for data analysis are the reports (not well-suited to automation) and the ACS WMI provider (but no user-friendly interface for running process scripts). Technically, we could use the ACS WMI provider in OpsMgr rules, but this is not the easiest way to go about this. Using event rules in Operations Manager in this way leverages the existing rich data processing capabilities of OM 2007 and also separates this processing load.
Use case scenarios:
Let me elaborate through a few examples just to get you creativity jump-started here on all the ways you could tap this strategy as part of a more effective audit strategy in our organization.
Network Administrator
If you’re the person responsible for host-based security in your company, you could watch for high failed login counts on servers using an event rule, which would then prompt analysis of Event Data collected by ACS to identify from which systems the attempts came from.
Internal Auditor
If you’re an internal auditor with key data security initiatives, you could use configure audit policies and use Event Rules in Operations Manager 2007 to set trigger alerts on key security events that prompt analysis. If a malicious user accesses a file share on the ERP Server where spreadsheets containing payroll data is stored, you could catch this through an Event Rule targeting an event Security Event Log. And then go do your analysis to establish the undeniable sequence of events required for punitive action.
Active Directory Administrator
By enabling the right audit policies, we can use rules to watch changes for any object class or instance in the Active Directory to catch who and when unplanned or unauthorized activities: Trusts, group policies, OUs, sensitive security groups, topology changes (sites, site links, subnets). And then, if necessary, we can then go ACS to review a given users recent activities to see what else they’ve been up to ;)
There’s a much bigger picture to consider for the heterogeneous enterprise and the future of ACS. We will start this discussion in part 3.
Your thoughts and comments are welcome on this post or via the contact page.